This paper provides an incomplete markets model with oligopolistic competition among an endogenous number of producers. The model matches the empirical distribution of income and wealth in the United States. The interaction between oligopolistic competition and incomplete markets reconciles the increase in the pro…t share of income with the decrease in the labor share of income and the increase in income inequality observed over the last three decades in the United States. Welfare costs associated with an increase in market power are large and unequally distributed across households.
Introduction
This paper explores the link between imperfect competition in the goods market and the distribution of income and wealth across households. Toward that goal, we provide a general equilibrium incomplete markets model, in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994) , where agents are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic earning shocks and enrich it with aspects of industrial organization. Market structures are endogenous (EMSs, henceforth) since the number of producers and price markups are endogenously determined through sunk entry costs and oligopolistic competition a là Bertrand or a là Cournot.
The economy features distinct sectors, each one characterized by many …rms supplying goods that can be imperfectly substitutable to a di¤erent degree, taking strategic interactions into account. Earning shocks, together with incomplete …nancial markets, lead to cross-sectional heterogeneity in income and wealth.
The degree of market power, as measured by the price markup, depends endogenously on the form of competition, on the degree of substitutability between goods and on the equilibrium number of …rms. The investment in new productive units is …nanced by households through the accumulation of shares in the portfolio of …rms. As in Bilbiie et al. (2012) , Jaimovich & Floetotto (2008) and Etro & Colciago (2010) the entry of a new …rm into the market amounts to the creation of a new product.
The stock-market price of this investment is determined by technological sunk entry costs and by the extent of competition in the market for …nal goods. Together with the shares'payo¤, coming from oligopolistic pro…ts, it endogenizes the return on investment. The level of the price markup determines the allocation of income across labor and pro…ts.
1
In the United States wealth is highly concentrated and very unequally distributed, much more so than income. We describe an environment with no aggregate uncertainty, calibrate it to resemble the U.S. economy in 1989, and solve for the ergodic distribution or steady state of the model. 1 Both the Bertrand and the Cournot frameworks endogenously match the distribution of wealth and income in the data. In particular, both frameworks imply that more than 80 percent of total wealth is in the hands of the top quintile of the wealth distribution. This results in a Gini concentration coe¢ cient of about 80 percent, as in US data.
Given the high concentration of stock ownership, dividend income bene…ts disproportionately a restricted group of households. As a result, both models deliver an income distribution characterized by a Gini concentration coe¢ cient of about 50 percent, like that in the US. Since the price markup is higher under Cournot with respect to Bertrand, the labor share of income is lower under the former market structure and for this reason, income is slightly more unequally distributed.
Besides showing that market power helps to address inequality in wealth and income at a point in time, our analysis shows that the interaction between EMSs and incomplete markets helps explaining …ve macroeconomics trends which characterized the US over the last thirty years.
In the last three decades the US has been characterized by (i) a decrease in the number of publicly traded …rms and an increase in the price markup; (ii) an increase in the pro…t share of income; (iii) a decrease in the labor share of income; (iv) an increase in the value of stock market capitalization over GDP and (v) an increase in income inequality.
We argue that these facts are intertwined. 2 Our model with strategic interactions among an endogenous number of producers can jointly reconcile these facts through an increase in the technological sunk entry costs faced by potential entrants in the markets for …nal goods. 3 The mechanism which allows the model to capture facts (i)-(v), both qualitatively and quantitatively, is based on one hand on the ability of the model to capture the concentration in the wealth distribution, and on the other hand on the negative relationship between the number of competitors in the market and the price markup implied by oligopolistic competition. An increase in entry costs leads to lower …rms'entry. As a result, competition is less intense and the price markup increases. The higher price markup is mirrored in a reduction in the labor share of income and in an increase in the pro…t share. The high concentration in the wealth distribution implies that the increase in dividend income bene…ts just asset holders, leading to an increase in income inequality.
To see that both features are necessary to explain facts (i)-(v), we compare our results under oligopolistic competition to those under monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition, strategic interactions between …rms are neglected. In this case, the price markup depends uniquely on the elasticity of substitution between goods. As a result, a change in entry costs which a¤ect the number of competitors in the market leaves the price markup una¤ected. While monopolistic pro…ts help to explain the concentration characterizing the US wealth distribution, the absence of a link between the intensity of competition and the price markup implies that the monopolistically competitive market structure cannot jointly explain the decrease in labor income and the increase in income inequality observed in the data.
We …nd that the welfare costs associated with an increase in market power are large and unevenly distributed across households. The majority of the population loses during the transition from the initial to the …nal, high-market-concentration, steady state. Speci…cally, those who lose are the agents for whom labor income represents the majority of total income. This is so since the increase in price markup resulting from higher concentration in the …nal goods market reduces the real wage, and thus their consumption during the transition to the new long-run equilibrium.
This paper is related to two strands of the macroeconomic literature. The …rst one is the quantitative literature on wealth and income inequality. Understanding the determinants of wealth inequality is a challenge for many economic models. De Nardi & Fella (2017) and Krueger et al. (2016) provide a quantitative assessment of the mechanisms which could lead to a concentrated wealth distribution in Bewley-Aiyagari models. Essentially, these mechanisms aim at providing agents with additional reasons to save besides the, standard, precautionary motive associated with income uncertainty. De Nardi & Fella (2017) review the main mechanisms which have been adopted in the literature. These are the inter-generational transmission of bequests and human capital, preference heterogeneity, complex earning dynamics, only partially insured medical expenditure shocks in old age, entrepreneurship as in Cagetti & De Nardi (2006) , or idiosyncratic shocks to investment opportunities or its returns, as in Benhabib et al. (2011) .
Our work suggests that a relatively straightforward extension of the baseline incomplete markets model, namely oligopolistic competition with endogenous …rms'dynamics, is successful at matching concentration facts. At the basis of this result is the endogeneity of the stock-market price together with the shares'payo¤ due to oligopolistic pro…ts.
The second related strand of the literature is that which studies the relationship between …nal goods market concentration, price markups, and factors'share. Autor et al. (2017) hypothesize that industries are increasingly characterized by a "winner takes all" feature, where few …rms can gain a very large share of the market. Large …rms have lower labor shares if production requires a …xed amount of overhead labor in addition to size-dependent variable labor input, or if markups in the product market correlate positively with …rm size. At the same time, Gao et al. (2013) , Doidge et al. (2017) , Grullon et al. (2017) and others, show that the number of public …rms has signi…cantly declined since the late 1990s. Grullon et al. (2017) …nd that the pro…tability of …rms, as measured by the Return on Asset, is negatively related to the number of peers in the market. Concentration has, thus, increased at both the intensive margin, due to more concentrated sales, and at the extensive margin, due to fewer competitors in the relevant market. Autor et al. (2017) emphasize that the increase in the price markup spreading from higher concentration could be at the root of the secular downward trend in the labor share of income observed in various countries around the world. Barkai (2016) provides reduced-form empirical evidence that a decline in competition plays a signi…cant role in the decline in the labor share. Edmond et al. (2015) provide an oligopolistic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous …rms and complete markets where markups in the product market correlate positively with …rms'market shares. The implications of their model are consistent with the empirical …ndings in Autor et al. (2017) . Edmond et al. (2018) study the welfare costs associated with market power in this setting and …nd that the welfare costs of markups are large. Eggertsson et al. (2018) and De Loecker et al. (2018) argue that the recent increase in markups could explain both the decrease in the labor share of income and the increase in the dividend share of income.
The main contribution of our paper to this literature is that of providing a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets where the extent of market concentration a¤ects markups, factors'share and stock market returns and, through these channels, impacts on the distribution of income and wealth. With respect to Edmond et al. (2015) , Edmond et al. (2018) , Eggertsson et al. (2018) and De Loecker et al. (2018) , we make the key step of relating the extent of competition in the market for …nal goods to the degree of wealth and income inequality. Due to heterogeneity across households and incomplete markets, we can study both the aggregate welfare cost associated with market power and how its burden is distributed across households characterized by di¤erent wealth and productivity levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical literature documenting macroeconomic trends (i)-(v), Section 3 spells out the model economy, Section 4 de…nes the equilibrium concepts used in the analysis, Section 5 calibrates the initial steady state, Section 6 displays the main results, Section 7 concludes.
Macroeconomic Trends in the US over the last Thirty years
In this section we describe …ve macroeconomic trends that have been characterizing the US economy over the last thirty years and are jointly captured by our model. Recent changes in the U.S. competitive landscape. There has been a structural change in the competitive landscape of U.S. industries in the last thirty years. Grullon et al. (2017) argue that more than 75% of US industries experienced an increase in sales concentration. At the same time, Gao et al. (2013) , Doidge et al. (2017) , Grullon et al. (2017) and others, show that the number of public …rms has signi…cantly declined since the late 1990s. As mentioned above, concentration has, thus, increased at both the intensive margin, due to more concentrated sales, and at the extensive margin, due to fewer competitors in the relevant market. To give a quantitative ‡avor of these facts, Figure 1 plots yearly percentage deviations in the number of US-listed …rms and the median price markup in US industries estimated by De Loecker et al. (2018) . The latter authors estimate …rms-level markups using Compustat data on the universe of U.S. publicly traded …rms. We report their weighted average markup, across the economy, where weights are based on …rm-level sales. Average markups have gone up since the 1980s. 4 Deviations are taken with respect to the values assumed by these variables in 1989, which we take as the baseline period in our analysis. Grullon et al. (2017) examine several possible explanations that could be at the root of the secular increase in market concentration. Among them, they consider an increase in barriers to entry. As argued by Grullon et al. (2017) , If technological barriers to entry are an important factor behind the increase in market concentration, then …rms in more concentrated markets should hold a stronger patent portfolio. Their …ndings suggest that, indeed, patent concentration follows a pattern very close to that of sales concentration.
Factors' shares, stock market capitalization and income inequality. Figure 2 displays yearly percentage deviations, from 1989, in corporate pro…ts over GDP and Stock Market Capitalization to GDP for the United States. Figure 3 displays the dynamics of the labor share of income. 5 Karabarbounis et al. (2014) observe that the share of aggregate income paid as compensation to labor is frequently used as a proxy for income inequality. If capital holdings are very concentrated among high-income individuals, increasing their share of GDP, all else equal, widens the gap with poorer workers. Indeed, another macroeconomic trend over the last three decades in many advanced and developing economies is the rise in income inequality. Figure 4 displays the evolution of the Gini Index for income since 1989 in the U.S.
The Model
The economy features a continuum of atomistics sectors, or industries, on the unit interval. Each sector is characterized by di¤erent …rms producing a good in di¤erent varieties and using labor as the only input. In turn, the sectoral goods are imperfect substitutes for each other and are aggregated into a …nal good. Oligopolistic competition and endogenous …rms'entry are modeled at the sectoral level. At the beginning of each period, N e jt new …rms enter into sector j 2 (0; 1), while at the end of the period a fraction 2 (0; 1) of market participants exits from the market for exogenous reasons 6 . As a result, the number of …rms in a sector N jt follows the equation of motion:
where N e jt is the number of new entrants in sector j at time t. Following Bilbiie et al. (2012) , we assume that new entrants at time t will only start producing at time t + 1 and that the probability of exit from the market, , is independent of the period of entry and identical across sectors. The assumption of an exogenous constant exit rate is adopted for tractability but it also has empirical support. Using U.S. annual data on manufacturing, Lee & Mukoyama (2008) …nd that, although the entry rate is procyclical, annual exit rates are similar across booms and recessions.
Alternative forms of competition between the …rms within each sector are considered below. In particular, the focus is on the approach based on oligopolistic competition developed by Jaimovich & Floetotto (2008) and Etro & Colciago (2010) . As in Ghironi & Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2012) , who gave new life to the interesting literature on the role of entry in macroeconomic models, sunk entry costs are introduced to endogenize the number of …rms in each sector. The nature and form of the entry costs will be speci…ed below. Households use the …nal good for consumption purposes, inelastically supply labor to …rms, are subject to uninsurable labor income shocks and choose how much to save in the creation of new …rms through the stock market.
Firms and Technology
The …nal good is produced according to the function
where Y jt denotes the output of sector j and ! is the elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erent sectoral goods. The …nal good producer behaves competitively. In each sector j, there are N jt > 1 …rms producing di¤erentiated goods that are aggregated into a sectoral good by a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregating function de…ned as
where y jt (i) is the production of good i in sector j and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods. As in Etro & Colciago (2010) , a unit elasticity of substitution between goods belonging to di¤erent sectors is assumed. This allows realistic separation of limited substitutability at the aggregate level and high substitutability at the disaggregate level. Each …rm i in sector j produces a di¤erentiated good with the following production function
where A represents technology that is common across sectors and remains constant over time, while h c jt (i) is the labour input used by the individual …rm for the production of the …nal good. The unit intersectoral elasticity of substitution implies that nominal expenditure, EXP t , is identical across sectors. Thus, the …nal producer's demand for each sectoral good is
where P jt and faced by the producer of each variant is
where P jt is de…ned as
Using (6) and (5), the individual demand of good i can be written as a function of aggregate expenditure,
As technology, the entry cost and the exit probability are identical across sectors, in what follows the index j is disregarded to consider a representative sector.
Households
Households have unit mass and are in…nitely lived. Household i has expected utility given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the, common across households, discount factor, C t (i) is the consumption of the …nal good, and is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The household inelastically supplies one unit of labor and it is subject to idiosyncratic labor productivity risk as in Aiyagari (1994) . A households' labor productivity, z it , follows an AR(1) process in log given by log(z t (i)) = log(z t 1 (i)) + " t : Households enjoy labor and dividend income. The household maximizes (9) by choosing how much to consume and how much to invest in stocks. The timing of investment in the stock market is as in BGM (2012) and Chugh & Ghironi (2011) . At the beginning of period t, household i owns s t (i) shares of a mutual fund of the N t …rms that produce in that period, each of which pays a dividend d t . Denoting the value of a …rm with V t , it follows that the value of the portfolio held by the household is s t (i) V t N t . During period t, the household purchases s t+1 (i) shares in a fund of these N t …rms as well as the N e t new …rms created during period t, to be carried into period t + 1. Total stock market purchases are thus
At the very end of period t, a fraction of these …rms disappears from the market. 7 Following the production and sales of the N t varieties in the imperfectly competitive goods markets, …rms distribute the dividend d t to households. The household's total dividend income is thus D t = s t (i) d t N t . Households' labor income is composed by the real wage per e¢ ciency unit w t times the idiosyncratic productivity level z i;t .
The ‡ow budget constraint of the household is
where we impose the no short-selling constraint
First order conditions for utility maximization with respect to s t+1 (i) reads as
The latter holds with equality when s t+1 (i) > 0.
Endogenous Entry
Upon entry, …rms face a sunk cost, de…ned as f t = =A t units of labor, with > 0. Note that under this speci…cation, the level of technology a¤ecting the productivity of the workers that produce goods is identical to that of the workers that create new businesses. As such A is the aggregate level of technology. In each period entry is determined endogenously to equate the value of …rms to the entry costs.
Strategic Interactions
In each period, the same expenditure for each sector EXP t is allocated across the available goods according to the standard direct demand function derived from the expenditure minimization problem of households. It follows that the direct individual demand faced by a …rm, y t (i), can be written as
Inverting the direct demand functions, the system of inverse demand functions can be derived:
which will be useful in the remainder of the analysis. Firms cannot credibly commit to a sequence of strategies, therefore their behavior is equivalent to maximize current pro…ts in each period taking as given the strategies of the other …rms. A main interest of this study is in the evaluation of the income and wealth long-run distribution delivered by popular forms of competition between …rms, such as competition in prices and quantities. Firms take as given their marginal cost of production and the aggregate nominal expenditure. 8 Under di¤erent forms of competition, we obtain equilibrium relative prices satisfying
where wt At is the real marginal cost and ( ; N t ) > 1 is the markup function. In the next sections, the markup functions under alternative forms of market competition are characterized.
Price Competition
Consider competition in prices. In each period, the gross pro…ts of …rm i can be expressed as:
Firms compete by choosing their prices. We consider two alternative approaches to this problem. The …rst one is the traditional monopolistic competition approach, which neglects strategic interactions between …rms. The second one is the Bertrand approach, where strategic interactions are taken into consideration. The outcome of pro…t maximization under monopolistic competition is well known. Each …rm i chooses the price p t (i) to maximize pro…t taking as given the price of the other …rms, neglecting the e¤ect of their price choice on the sectoral price index. The symmetric equilibrium price is p t = M C ( ) W t =A t , which is associated with the constant price markup M C ( ) = ( 1) . The latter does not depend on the extent of competition but just on the elasticity of substitution between goods. Under Bertrand competition, each …rm i chooses the price p t (i) to maximize pro…t taking as given the price of other …rms. The …rst-order condition for any …rm i is:
Note that the term on the right-hand side is the e¤ect of the price strategy of a …rm on the price index: higher prices reduce overall demand, therefore …rms tend to set higher markups compared to monopolistic competition. The symmetric equilibrium price p t must satisfy
where the markup reads as
As discussed in more detail in Etro & Colciago (2010) , the markup is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products and in the number of …rms. Importantly, when N t ! 1 the markup tends to M C ( ), the standard one under monopolistic competition 9 .
Quantity Competition
Consider now competition in quantities in the form of Cournot competition. Using the inverse demand function (13), the pro…t function of a …rm i can be expressed as a function of its output y t (i) and the output of all the other …rms:
Assume now that each …rm chooses its production y t (i) taking as given the production of the other …rms. The …rst-order conditions:
for all …rms i = 1; 2; :::; N t can be simpli…ed imposing the symmetry of the Cournot equilibrium. This generates the individual output:
Substituting into the inverse price, one obtains the equilibrium price
is the markup under competition in quantities. For a given number of …rms, the markup under competition in quantities is always larger than the one obtained before under competition in prices, as is well known for models of product di¤erentiation Vives (1999, see, for instance).
Note that the markup is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products and in the number of competitors. Finally, only when N t ! 1 the markup tends to M C ( ), the markup under monopolistic competition.
Aggregation and Market Clearing
Let t (s; z) de…ne the distribution of households across wealth and productivity levels in a given period t. Aggregate supply of labour reads as L s t = R z t (i)l t (i)d t = 1. Aggregate labor demand is, instead, the sum between labor used for production purposes L c t = N t l c t , and that used to create new …rms L e t = N e t At . As a result, labor market clearing requires L c + L e = 1:
Equilibrium in the stock market reads as R s t (i)d t = 1: Finally, aggregating the individual household budget constraint in equation 10 and imposing the clearing of labor and asset markets we obtain the aggregate accounting relationship
is aggregate consumption. Notice that V t N e t represents the value of total investment. The aggregate accounting relationship states that the sum between consumption and investment must equal GDP; that is the sum between labor and dividend income.
Equilibrium Concepts
Given a deterministic sequence of entry costs f t g 1 t=0 and the initial distribution of agents 0 a recursive stationary equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of policy functions fg s t ; g c t g 1 t=0 , aggregate variables t = fN t ; N e t ; V t ; t ; t ; Y t ; w t ; L c t ; L e t g 1 t=0 and distributions f t g 1 t=0 such that in every period t:
1. Given the aggregate quantities t , the policy functions g s t (s; z) and g c t (s; z) solve the households'problem in equations 11 and 10 2. Aggregate variables in t satisfy …rms optimality conditions
Markets clear

Stationary Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium is characterized by policy functions g s (s; z) and g c (s; z), a set of aggregate variables = fN; N e ; V; ; ; Y; w; L c ; L e g 10 and a distribution of agents (s; z) such that: 1. Given the aggregate variables in , the policy functions g s (s; z) and g c (s; z) solve the households'problem in equations 11 and 10 2. Aggregate variables in satisfy …rms optimality conditions
Markets clear
The distribution (s; z) is the ergodic distribution implied by the exogenous transition matrix for labor productivity and the policy function g s (s; z). This distribution gives two information at the same time: on the cross-sectional dimension it indicates the fraction of agents in each state while, on the time series dimension, it gives the share of time each agent spends in each state.
Recursive Equilibrium
To assess the aggregate and distributional implications of a rise in barriers to entry, we simulate a deterministic transition from the initial stationary equilibrium to a …nal one characterized by a higher sunk entry cost. Timing is as follows: at time t = 0 the economy is in the initial steady state (denoted by I ) and the end of the period the entry cost increases. From t = 1 the economy transit to the …nal steady state (indicated by F ). Given a deterministic sequence of entry costs f t g 1 t=0 and the initial distribution of agents I a recursive stationary equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of policy functions fg s t ; g c t g 1 t=0 , aggregate variables f t g 1 t=0 and distributions f t g 1 t=0 such that in every period t: 11 1. given t , the decision rules g s t and g c t solve the individual problems 2. t is consistent with …rms optimality conditions 3. markets clear 4. the distribution t evolves according to t+1 = P t where P is a transition function de…ned by the saving policy function g s t together with the exogenous transition matrix for the productivity process :
Calibration
The model is solved numerically using a discretization of the state space. Speci…cally, the households'problem is solved adopting the Endogenous Grid Method developed by Carroll (2006) and by approximating the policy functions through linear splines. Our solution algorithm, described in detail in the Appendix, takes non-linearities and uncertainty in idiosyncratic dynamics into account.
A period corresponds to a year. Standard values are chosen for the discount factor = 0:96; the intrasectoral elasticity of substitution = 6 and the risk aversion parameter in the utility function = 1:5. The exit probability, , is set to 0.1 as in BGM (2012). Consistently with the no-short selling constraint, the minimum individual amount of shares is 0. The maximum (which is equal to 25) is such that it is never binding in any state of the world. To approximate the policy functions, we use 500 exponentially spaced nodes in this interval, while the grid used for the distribution is equispaced and …ner (5000 nodes).
Parameters characterizing the AR(1) process for (the log of) labor productivity 12 are those estimated by Krueger et al. (2016) using PSID data. The autoregressive coe¢ cient is = 0:9695 and the variance of the earnings process equals 2 = 0:0384. We choose Rouwenhorst method to discretize the stochastic process for productivity. As stated by Kopecky & Suen (2010) , this method is more robust than the more often used Tauchen method, in particular for very persistent processes.
Special care must be devoted to the calibration of the entry costs as they are one of the main determinants of the degree of market power and become the forcing variable in our experiment concerning the macroeconomic implications of a rise in market power.
We set them as follows. We take the Cournot model as the benchmark model and set the entry cost such that the endogenous price markup equals the estimate of the median price markup across US industries provided by De Loecker et al. (2018) in 1989. We then compute the ergodic wealth and income distributions implied by the model. Holding …xed the value of the entry cost we run the same exercise under Bertrand competition. 13 We select 1989 as the initial year because this is the earliest year available of the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). The SCF is a special survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. As discussed by Kuhn & Rios-Rull (2016) , its sample size of over 6,000 households is appreciably smaller than that of other surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), which has a sample size of 60,000 households.
Despite its small sample size, the SCF is particularly careful to represent the upper tail of the wealth distribution by oversampling rich households. This unique sampling scheme makes the SCF particularly well suited for discussing the earnings, income, and wealth concentration at the top. We take income and wealth distributions, together with concentration indexes, from the analysis of the SCF conducted by Kuhn & Rios-Rull (2016) .
As mentioned above, we then simulate an increase in sunk technological entry costs which lead to higher market power. Speci…cally, we increase the entry costs in Cournot up to the point where the price markup equals the value of the median price markup across US industries estimated by De Loecker et al. (2018) In the next section, we will evaluate the ability of our model at matching the distributions of wealth and income observed in 1989 in the US. Then we will run our experiment and assess the distributional implications of a rise in barriers to entry. In the remainder, we will refer to the intial calibration as to the 89-calibration, while to the calibration characterizing the high concentration equilibrium as to the 07-calibration.
Results
Income and Wealth Distributions Under Alternative Market Structures
In this section, we evaluate the extent to which our model can match the empirical distributions of wealth and income in 1989. Tables 2 and 3 report, respectively, the implied wealth and income distributions under Bertrand and Cournot, we also report statistics for the monopolistically competitive case, and compare them to the empirical ones provided by Kuhn & Rios-Rull (2016) , which are based on the SCF in 1989. As mentioned in the Introduction, matching the empirical wealth distribution and its concentration in Bewley-Aiyagary models is challenging. Both the Cournot and Bertrand models, as well as the monopolistic competitive framework, essentially match the US wealth distribution. Notice that the concentration of the distribution of wealth is not matched by construction in the calibration procedure. Notice also that, as in the data, the wealth distribution is more concentrated than the income distribution.
At the basis of this result is the direct link between investment and economic pro…ts in EMSs incomplete markets models. Households hold assets for precautionary reasons. Assets holders are entitled to a share of aggregate pro…ts. For this reason, the income of wealth-rich households is, to a large extent, constituted by dividend income. There is thus a feedback mechanism for which asset-rich households also have higher income, which, in turn, feeds back into more asset holdings. The model underestimates the fraction of income accruing to the top 1% of the income distribution, but it exactly matches the Gini coe¢ cient relative to the bottom 99%. 14 In the next sections, we assess the e¤ects of an increase in technological entry costs on market power on some key macroeconomic variables, on the wealth and income distributions, and on welfare.
The Implications of a Rise in Market Power
Macroeconomic trends
In this section, we evaluate whether in response to an increase in technological entry costs our model can account for the macroeconomic trends described in Section 2. Namely, whether it can explain a decrease in the number of …rms together with an increase in price markups, an increase in the value of stock market capitalization and aggregate pro…ts with respect to GDP, a decrease in the labor share and an increase in income inequality.
We also compare the wealth an income distributions implied by our model in 2007, namely eighteen periods after the increase in entry costs, to the empirical ones in 2007 in the US (See Table 4 ). Consider that, starting from the 89-calibration, the new ergodic income and wealth distributions implied by the 07-calibration requires about forty periods to be reached. For this reason, we regard the ergodic distributions under the 07-calibration as describing the long-run implications of our model for income and wealth distributions.
We report results for the Cournot and Bertrand framework. Under monopolistic competition the change in entry costs does not a¤ect the price markup. This implies that the allocation of income between capital and labor is una¤ected. In other words the labor share of income remains unchanged in the aftermath of the increase in sunk entry costs and concentration. The same holds for the wealth and income distributions. This highlights that the increase in the price markup which follows an increase in concentration and the resulting decrease in the labor share of income are key ingredients to explain the increase in income concentration observed in the US in the last decades. Figures 5-7 are the model-equivalent of Figures 1-3 , relative to US data, reported in Section 2. The model successfully reproduces the pattern of the variables of interest. An increase in entry costs leads to fewer competitors in the market. Due to EMSs, this leads to an increase in the price markup. Remarkably we obtain a relative pattern between capitalization over GDP and pro…ts over GDP which is very close to that in the data, also in terms of quantitative variations, under both Bertrand and Cournot. The magnitude of the reduction in the labor share of income is also comparable to that in the data. The reduction in the labor share of income is closer to that observed in the data under Cournot competition. This is due to the larger increase in the price markup observed under Cournot, which is close to that reported by De Loecker et al. (2018) . The latter is due to the higher elasticity of the price markup with respect to the number of competitors implied by Cournot competition with respect to Bertrand. Table 4 shows the distribution of wealth implied by the model in 2007, and compares it with the SCF data provided by Kuhn & Rios-Rull (2016) for the same year. Table 5 shows the distribution of income. The fraction of wealth in the hands of the top quintile increases under both frameworks. Although with a lower extent with respect to that in the data, our models match the increase in wealth concentration. We, instead, match quantitatively the change in the Gini index relative to income. In our model, in line with the empirical evidence in Kuhn & Rios-Rull (2016) , …nancial income is the key driver of the increase in income inequality.
Quintiles
SCF 89 
Welfare e¤ects
It this section, we asses who gains and who loses, in welfare terms, in the aftermath of the increase in market power characterized in the previous section. To do so we compute the individual welfare changes, and their distribution across the population, and the welfare change experienced by society as a whole during the transition from the initial steady state to the …nal one. The welfare level of agent i at time t is measured by her expected lifetime utility, de…ned as:
The subscript i indicates that the consumption path is conditional on agents' initial states (wealth, s, and productivity, z). We denote values assumed by variables in the initial steady state with the superscript 89, to emphasize that they are relative to the 89-calibration; we denote, instead, the values that variables assume during the transition to the new stationary state with the superscript tr, which stands for "transition". Following Floden (2001) and Domeij & Heathcote (2004) , we express the individual welfare change in terms of Consumption Equivalent Variation (CEV), de…ned as the value of ! i that solves:
The constant ! i measures the percentage change in lifetime consumption that makes an agent indi¤erent between remaining in the initial steady state forever or moving to the …nal steady state. A positive value of ! i implies that the rise in market power leads to a welfare gain for that particular individual and vice-versa.
The value of ! i is conditional on the initial states, as such we compute a consumption equivalent for each type of agent and we obtain a cross-sectional distribution of CEVs. this space identi…es an agent-type. The size of each circle is proportional to the share of the population that experience the identi…ed welfare loss. The general message of the Figure is that agents who lose are those for whom labor income represents the majority of total income. This is so for wealth-poor agents, independently of their productivity, but also for highly productive agents, independently of their wealth. For these agents, the increase in …nancial income does not compensate for the loss in labor income spreading from the higher markup. Just 23% of households in Cournot and 25% in Bertrand and Monopolistic Competition enjoy a welfare gain, which implies that higher market concentration makes the vast majority of the population worse o¤.
An indicator of the e¤ect of the increased market power on the economy as a whole is given by the utilitarian social welfare gain ! u . This represents the average welfare gain in the economy, but it can also be interpreted as the ex-ante welfare gain, that is the welfare gain of a newborn who does not yet know her type, hence her position in the asset-productivity space. The utilitarian social welfare gain is the value of ! u which solves
Notice that in the expression above R E 0 V (fc it g 1 t=0 ) d represents the utilitarian social welfare, i.e. the average expected lifetime utility computed assigning to each agent the same weight. As additional evidence that an increase in market power is not bene…cial for the economy, the social welfare variation in Cournot equals -16% of aggregate consumption, while it rises to -13% in Bertrand and to -12% in Monopolistic Competition. The variation in the extent of competition among …rms a¤ects contemporaneously the level of aggregate consumption, the distribution of income among households, and the ability of individuals to self-insure against earning shocks through savings. For this reason we follow Floden (2001) and decompose the utilitarian social welfare variation in three components: an aggregate (or level) component ! lev , an an inequality component, ! ine , and an uncertainty component, ! unc .
To disentangle the three components one must compute individual certainty-equivalent consumption ( c i ). This value is such that V (fc i g 1 t=0 ) = E 0 V (fc it g 1 t=0 ). It represents the constant amount that agent i should consume in each period from t onwards in order to have the same expected utility as she gets during the transition to the …nal steady state. The uncertainty component is then measured comparing actual consumption during the transition, c it to the certainty equivalent, c i . The inequality component comes from the distribution of the certaintyequivalent across agents. Floden (2001) shows that, for separable utility functions, the following relationship between ! u and the three components described above holds: 17 1 + ! u = (1 + ! lev )(1 + ! unc )(1 + ! inc ): The aggregate welfare e¤ect of the rise in market power is negative: there are fewer …rms, aggregate output is lower and so are aggregate consumption and social welfare. The inequality component is also negative: the shift in the composition of income in favor of …nancial income leads to a more unequal distribution of resources due to the highly concentrated stock ownership. The negative average e¤ect is, however, partially mitigated by the positive e¤ect coming from the reduction in consumption uncertainty. Financial income is not subject to risk in our framework. As a result, asset holders experience a reduction in the uncertainty of their overall income and consumption. Under Cournot competition, the e¤ects are quantitatively more sizeable with respect to other market structures due to a larger variation in the price markup in response to the change in the extent of competition. A higher price markup leads to a stronger reduction in aggregate consumption, but to a higher …nancial income which at the same time increases inequality and reduces income uncertainty.
Conclusions
This paper provides a model with incomplete …nancial markets where agents are subject to uninsurable earning shocks. The markets for …nal goods are characterized by alternative, imperfectly competitive, endogenous market structures. The degree of market power, as measured by the price markup, depends endogenously on the form of competition, on the degree of substitutability between goods and on the equilibrium number of …rms.
The interaction between incomplete markets and EMSs delivers long run ergodic distribution of wealth and income which are consistent with those in US data. Further, when we simulate the e¤ects of an increase in technological barriers to entry for new …rms we obtain an increase in price markups, a decrease in the labor share of income and an increase in income concentration which are broadly consistent with those observed in the data between 1989 and 2007. Our results suggest that a decline in the labor share of income leads to higher income inequality if wealth is unequally distributed, as in the US. The welfare analysis shows that the vast majority of the population su¤ers a welfare loss in the aftermath of an increase in market concentration.
This work suggests that a relatively straightforward extension of the Bewley-Aiyagari model, namely oligopolistic competition with endogenous …rms dynamics, is successful at reproducing concentration facts and their evolution over the last 30 years. Notice that we focus on the extensive margin of competition, which is related to the number of competitors in the market. Edmond et al. (2015) address contemporaneously both the extensive and the intensive margin, the one which spreads from heterogeneity in market shares across …rms. We are currently extending our framework to account for …rms heterogeneity and disentangle the e¤ects of both margins of competition on the distributions of income and wealth.
